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This article explores the intersection of (1) policing and police intelligence with (2) 
national intelligence and military intelligence. The premise is that for more than 150 
years, prior to the events of September 11, 2001, police intelligence had little connection 
to national or military intelligence. Basically, national intelligence focused on serious 
world-wide political and economic threats to the nation’s well-being; military 
intelligence focused specifically on military threats to the national security; the police 
focused their intelligence work on criminals who posed threats to individuals and local 
communities. A fairly clear division of labor was in place, based largely on the type and 
scale of threats. 
Since 9/11, however, it has become plausible that a small group of non-state actors, 
such as terrorists, could launch a serious attack against the nation using weapons of 
mass destruction, or even small arms, as in Mumbai. These individuals might live in a 
local U.S. community or halfway across the world, yet plan and execute a massive and 
violent attack against a local U.S. community. They might also commit ordinary crimes 
to help finance their larger intentions. In this new context of terrorism and asymmetric 
threats, a local police department might develop intelligence of significant interest to 
national and military intelligence, or vice versa. 
Important historical, conceptual, and policy issues associated with the intersection of 
national, military, and police intelligence are discussed more fully elsewhere.1 This 
article presents the results of a small-scale study in which subject matter experts were 
asked to respond to several scenarios related to intelligence and information sharing, 
asking both what should happen and what would actually happen. 
U.S. POLICING 
Policing in the United States is civilian (non-military), predominantly local (funded and 
directed by local governments), and extremely fragmented. It is not just that police are 
distributed all around the country2 – they mostly answer to local elected officials. The 
U.S. has almost 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies, roughly 16,000 of which are 
local. Of the remaining 2,000 agencies, the vast majority represent special jurisdictions 
(university police, transit police, park police, etc.), followed by state agencies, and lastly 
by federal non-military agencies. Out of 837,000 full-time sworn police personnel 
(armed with arrest authority), 74 percent work for local agencies, 13 percent work for 
federal law enforcement, and 13 percent work for state or special jurisdiction law 
enforcement agencies.3 
The two largest components of U.S. policing are both local: municipal police 
departments (cities, towns, townships, boroughs, villages) and county sheriff’s offices.4 
Two characteristics of these types of law enforcement agencies are absolutely essential 
for understanding their capabilities and contexts: most are small (77 percent have fewer 
than twenty-five full-time sworn officers)5 and they are all independent of each other. 
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There is no chain of command in the police industry – within individual agencies, yes, 
but among and between the 18,000 agencies, no.6 
Along with industry structure, it is important to note a thing or two about police work 
and police culture. Particularly at the local and state levels, police officers in the field 
frequently act alone and without immediate supervision. Much of their work involves 
making “low visibility decisions” – especially when an officer’s decision does not result 
in a report or an arrest (and most police actions and decisions do not), it is rarely subject 
to review. If an officer’s decision does not result in a report or arrest, it probably will not 
produce any official information for later analysis. As Peter Manning notes, 
“information in police departments can best be characterized as systematically 
decentralized. Often, primary data known to one officer are not available to other 
officers” because they are stored in the officer’s head or personal notes. Moreover, “all 
essential police knowledge is thought to be contextual, substantive, detailed, concrete, 
temporally bounded, and particularistic” while information in official reports and files is 
often viewed by officers and investigators as trivial, having been created and 
manipulated mainly for bureaucratic purposes.7 
Additionally, police agencies and police culture tend to celebrate and reward good 
arrests. Information and intelligence, by themselves, are not traditional units of police 
work, they are not measured, and producing them is not rewarded. Also, information 
that is not directly connected to an incident, crime, or case does not have a natural home 
in the typical police records system – there is no file to put it in. Incidents, crimes, and 
cases are traditionally assigned to individual officers (or detectives) who are evaluated 
on how well they handle and dispose of these events. Consequently, the tendency is for 
officers and detectives to hold information closely in order to use it later to enhance 
their own productivity. 
It is also important to recognize that U.S. police, not just the military and federal law 
enforcement agencies, engaged in intelligence-related abuses in the 1960s and 1970s.8 
Informants, undercover operations, and electronic surveillance were often used to 
gather information about civil rights and anti-war groups. Subsequent inquiries showed 
that many of the targets of these intelligence operations were not involved in any serious 
criminal behavior, but rather were engaged in political activities in opposition to 
prevailing government policies, such as the Vietnam War. Local police intelligence 
capabilities were significantly curtailed in the wake of exposes of these abuses, and in 
some jurisdictions have yet to recover.9 
The point of these observations is that the structure of U.S. policing, the nature of 
police work, some historical stumbles, and common features of police culture all seem to 
conspire against an intelligence-led approach to policing and the free flow of 
information.10 To this we can add the traditional tensions between levels of policing in 
our federal system. State and federal law enforcement are often represented or 
perceived as more important and more professional than local police – much to the 
resentment of local police. Local police sometimes also fear state and federal agencies, 
because those agencies have the authority to investigate public corruption and civil 
rights violations in local communities. Specifically on the issue of information sharing, a 
common complaint is that it is a one-way street – local police provide information to 
their state and federal “partners” but get little or nothing in return. The following 
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anecdote from one of the subject matter experts who participated in this project 
illustrates the common local police experience and perspective: 
Person is stopped off I-35 North of Georgetown, TX. Subject has possession of 
numerous photographs of large venue HVAC systems, such as stadia and arenas. 
Subject is a Middle Eastern engineering student. First photos are of subject inside 
Reunion Hotel in Dallas, obviously shot by someone else. Subject alone when 
stopped. Digital photographs copied by police. Local police notify Secret Service 
because of proximity to Western White House. Secret Service tails subject until 
they lose him. THEN they notify FBI, which enters information into Threat 
Matrix. Local police notified after subject left the country. 
Frustration with federal-local information sharing has led the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) to station overseas personnel in eleven posts, including London, 
Paris, Abu Dhabi, and Amman.11 Their post-9/11 reasoning is that (1) their city is a likely 
target of international terrorism, (2) they are not confident that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or other federal agencies will 
share important information with them immediately, and therefore (3) they want their 
own people on the ground around the world in the places where key intelligence might 
be uncovered. They also argue that local police in Tel Aviv or Madrid are more likely to 
share information with U.S. local police than with U.S. federal officials. 
In spite of all these longstanding and fundamental challenges, since 9/11 there is 
evidence of improved intelligence gathering and information sharing. Local police have 
been encouraged to collect and forward a new type of document, Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SAR).12 State-level fusion centers have been created to serve as the link 
between local agencies and federal/national agencies and networks;13 some of these 
have even been granted access to classified Department of Defense information 
systems.14 Local and state agencies have reported increased contacts with the likes of the 
FBI, CIA, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
and National Guard.15 At the national level, reorganization of the intelligence 
community, increased emphasis on counter-terrorism in the FBI, creation of the 
National Counterterrorism Center, and establishment of an Information Sharing 
Environment all reflect serious attention toward intelligence and information sharing.16 
Numerous obstacles still exist,17 but the consensus is that information sharing is 
improving. 
THIS STUDY 
This study examines how terrorism-related intelligence and information is shared 
between local police, on the one hand, and state police, federal law enforcement, 
intelligence agencies, and the military in the post-9/11 era. It was understood that 
federal laws, state laws, secrecy provisions, and security clearances all affect what can be 
shared in different situations.18 Also, it was presumed that most local police had 
longstanding communication channels with state and federal law enforcement (whether 
effective or ineffective), but not with intelligence agencies or the military. Thus, if local 
police came into possession of information that might be of interest to a federal agency, 
intelligence agency, or the military, what would they do? Similarly, if the military or CIA 
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came upon some information in Central Asia with ramifications for a local community 
in Middle America, what would they do? 
Methodology 
Six short scenarios/vignettes were sent to a small non-random sample of subject matter 
experts in 2008. The scenarios were designed to represent a variety of realistic 
situations in which information sharing might be desirable and might or might not 
occur. The common ingredient in each scenario was a Kentucky connection, only 
because both authors taught at Eastern Kentucky University at the time. The main 
purpose was to ground the scenarios in a typical and realistic setting, without 
introducing the complexity that might ensue if the location was New York, Los Angeles, 
or Washington, DC. 
Responses to the scenarios were obtained from fourteen experts. Of these, ten were 
police executives (identified hereafter as PE) or police intelligence (PI) practitioners, 
two were associated with military intelligence (MI), one was associated with federal law 
enforcement (FE), and one was an academic expert (AE). The police respondents 
represented six different states while the other respondents were also distributed 
around the country. 
The small size of the sample significantly limits any claims of statistical validity, as 
does the weighting of the sample toward police respondents. It is best to think of this 
study as an initial exploration of information sharing among police, intelligence 
agencies, and the military without any pretense that it accomplished a scientific 
measurement of the phenomenon.  
Scenarios 
We asked the subject matter experts to respond to several hypothetical scenarios that 
combined crime, terrorism, and information sharing issues. Six scenarios were 
presented following some general instructions: 
Listed below are several hypothetical scenarios that might involve 
information sharing among local, state, and federal law enforcement, 
intelligence agencies, and military agencies. Each scenario has a 
Kentucky connection, but you may feel free to apply it to your own local 
jurisdiction. We would appreciate any insight you could provide regarding 
two things in each scenario: 
• What would probably happen today in regard to information sharing? 
• What should happen, in your opinion? 
Scenario A: U.S. Army forces in Afghanistan find a computer in a terrorist 
camp that contains images of a chemical plant in Ashland, KY. 
Scenario B: A CIA agent in Africa observes a U.S. citizen meeting with 
elements of Al Qaeda. It is determined that the U.S. citizen lives in 
Elizabethtown, KY, which is near Fort Knox. 
Scenario C: A police officer in Hopkinsville, KY, near Fort Campbell, is 
told by a citizen that she (the citizen) knows an active duty soldier who has 
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rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in his garage. She says that he (the 
soldier) often talks about how easy it would be to shoot down a passenger 
airplane near the Nashville airport.  
Scenario D: A police officer in Lexington, KY, while handling a domestic 
dispute call at a residence in the city, sees quite a few interesting pieces 
of art. Casual inquiry reveals that the husband in the house is an Army 
reserve doctor recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq. The officer 
wonders whether the pieces of art might be stolen antiquities.  
Scenario E: A police officer in Louisville, KY responds to a call at a private 
residence. The parents of a 15-year-old boy show the officer the boy's 
computer, on which they found an elaborate plan to assemble a fertilizer 
truck bomb and explode it outside an Army recruiting station in Cincinnati, 
OH. 
Scenario F: An FBI analyst develops an intelligence report that indicates 
that organized groups are smuggling significant quantities of cigarettes out 
of Kentucky for resale in northern states where taxes are higher, and then 
sending the profits overseas to groups that are affiliated with Hezbollah. 
SHARING BY AND WITH LOCAL POLICE 
The post-9/11 focus on local police has mainly been on their role as “eyes and ears” in 
local communities throughout the nation. In this respect they are seen as very important 
collectors of information, of raw data that can be fed into the intelligence process in 
order to help analysts and others “connect the dots.” Community policing is seen by 
some as an ideal local police strategy because it helps officers get to know their 
communities and builds trust, making it more likely that residents will share important 
information with the police.19 It has become common to refer to local police as “first 
preventers” who are most likely to be in a position to prevent a terrorist act, both by 
gathering information and by taking action, when appropriate. This first preventer role 
is paired with the more familiar “first responder” role to make a logical and meaningful 
package that (1) demonstrates the synergy between effective crime reduction tactics and 
counterterrorism and (2) encourages local police to take their counterterrorism role 
more seriously.20 
The National Strategy for Information Sharing reiterated this expanded role for 
local police and provided a few specific examples: 
These partners are now a critical component of our Nation’s security capability as 
both “first preventers” and “first responders,” and their efforts have achieved 
concrete results within their communities, as the following examples illustrate: 
• A narcotics investigation – conducted by Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement officials and resulting in multiple arrests – revealed that a 
Canadian-based organization supplying precursor chemicals to Mexican 
methamphetamine producers was in fact a Hezbollah support cell. 
• A local police detective investigating a gas station robbery uncovered a 
homegrown jihadist cell planning a series of attacks. 
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• An investigation into cigarette smuggling initiated by a county sheriff’s 
department uncovered a Hezbollah support cell operating in several States.21 
Scenarios C, D, and E all focused on suspicious activity discovered by local police. None 
apparently involved international terrorism, but one or two might involve domestic 
terrorism, one might involve transnational crime, and all three involved the military in 
some way. 
Most project interviewees agreed that the local police department in Scenario C 
should, and would, forward its information about the soldier with the RPG to federal 
and/or military authorities. There was some disagreement over details, such as whether 
the investigation should be handled by the appropriate Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) or the military. Some variation in responses might have resulted because the 
scenario did not clearly specify whether the soldier’s garage was on or off the military 
base. One respondent indicated that the proper response should involve both 
information sharing and collaboration: 
The local police should investigate the soldier with members of the FBI and the 
military in a joint investigation since both criminal and possible terrorism 
activity may be involved. If follow up is warranted with the TSA and the Nashville 
airport, it should be the responsibility of the FBI. But in this case both criminal 
and national security intelligence may be obtained and can be disseminated to 
sworn law enforcement in the Nashville Airport area if a reasonable suspicion of 
an attack on a plane is detected. If the reason for wanting to shoot the plane is 
one of terror as opposed to some personal animosity, then the subject should also 
be entered into VGTOF (the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File in 
NCIC). (PI) 
This same respondent, though, indicated that what would happen might be less 
collaborative – the local police would conduct an investigation and they might contact 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) or the Nashville airport. From an 
information-sharing and intelligence standpoint, the possibility of the local police 
department conducting its own investigation without informing any other authorities 
would be the least desirable response, but also problematic could be joint investigations 
if they were initiated outside post-9/11 information-sharing procedures. For example, if 
the police and the Fort Campbell MPs conducted an investigation, or if the police and 
the local FBI office conducted an investigation, the raw information might never make it 
to the local agency’s intelligence unit, the state fusion center, the applicable JTTF, or the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). One respondent noted: 
Sharing of information with the military is always a problem. There are also 
problems associated with local information that is sent to the FBI first instead of 
traveling through normal local reporting structures first. If suspect information 
goes directly to the FBI, or other federal entity, the information is not generally 
disseminated down to the local level in a timely manner. Unfortunately, when 
this occurs, local intelligence information is often lost. Additionally, vulnerability 
assessments could be updated and local law enforcement resources could be 
allocated towards prevention efforts when local intelligence is received in a timely 
manner. (PI) 
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Scenario D was at most criminal in nature (possible possession of stolen art from Iraq) 
but involved a military service member. Respondents seemed to be split about evenly on 
whether the matter would be handled strictly by the local police or referred to either 
military or federal law enforcement. Since the evidence that a crime had occurred was 
limited, some thought the likelihood of any action was minimal. Most seemed to agree, 
though, that the proper action would be to share the information with the military. For 
example: 
Contact with military investigators should be made by the local agency sharing 
what the officer observed. Military should investigate and provide a follow up call 
back to the initiating agency as to whether or not the art is possibly stolen. In this 
case, if the military determines that there is reasonable suspicion that the 
paintings are stolen, possession of those paintings is then a crime and 
intelligence reports on the subject can be shared between the military police and 
the initiating agency. (PI) 
Scenario E involved a possible threat to a military recruiting station. Because it involved 
the threat of explosives, it elicited a familiar difference of opinion about whether the 
proper federal agency to contact should be the FBI or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF). These two agencies have feuded for years over the lead 
federal role in explosives investigation, resulting in conflict between the agencies, 
competition over specific cases, and mixed signals sent to state and local law 
enforcement. A 2009 U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General’s report indicates 
that this situation still persists.22 
There was also a split of opinions on whether the local police would conduct their 
own investigation, whether they would hand it off to the FBI, whether the military 
would be notified in a timely manner, and whether a joint investigation would ensue. 
Two examples: 
My guess is this would be handled completely by local authorities. It appears to 
be only peripherally related to the military. Ideally, the recruiting commander 
would be contacted, which would probably result in contact from Army CID. The 
information should be shared here, but it may never get out of CID. (MI) 
The local agency would share the information with the FBI and in turn the FBI 
would most likely investigate the boy directly prior to contacting the military. If 
the FBI determines that the subject is indeed a possible threat, he would be 
entered into VGTOF. (PI) 
There was more agreement about what should happen in this scenario – information 
should be shared and a joint investigation should be conducted. Responses varied on 
whether the conduit for information sharing should be a regional or state fusion center 
or some other network such as the Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG) that have 
been set up in some areas of the country. Since the scenario involved two local police 
departments in different states, as well as the military connection, established channels 
would seem to be important in making sure that information and intelligence sharing 
crossed state borders as well as agency boundaries. 
One respondent provided detailed information on additional steps that would be 
taken in his jurisdiction. This response strayed from the basic questions about 
information and intelligence sharing, but is worth reviewing because it illustrates the 
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kinds of concerns that local agencies have beyond just investigating a possible crime; 
they also tend to worry about others who might be involved, others who might have 
similar ideas, copycats, as well as fallout in the local community. 
The local police agency School Resource Officer (SRO) would be briefed and 
analysis would be conducted as to evidence of theft or purchase of various items 
needed to carry out any attack. Local police would also update local military 
recruiting stations and look for pre-incident indicators. A coordinated follow up 
with the military would be conducted.  
Since this type of information involves the internet and therefore could 
permeate our schools, our computer crimes unit would be used to monitor this 
type of activity as it relates to this suspect. Chances are if one student has this 
type of information, there are many more out there that may also be involved in 
criminal activity and not discovered by parents, schools, or others. The local 
police agency would not be satisfied with catching one student, but rather they 
would embark on an effort to educate parents and schools on how to be more 
vigilant at detecting these types of crimes. Specific computer and internet 
investigations into this activity may be warranted. (PI) 
STATE POLICE 
The post-9/11 environment has had potentially significant consequences for state police 
agencies.23 Each state has set up some type of homeland security apparatus to advise the 
governor and the legislature, oversee statewide threat assessment and infrastructure 
protection, receive and distribute DHS funds, provide training and assistance to local 
jurisdictions, etc. In many if not most states, the state police have naturally assumed a 
large role in these activities, since they are usually the largest state public safety agency 
(other than corrections, which has limited expertise on the counterterrorism issue and 
little responsibility for terrorism prevention, response, or investigation). The 
development of state fusion centers has also typically been with substantial state police 
involvement – the state police usually had a pre-existing intelligence unit,24 and they 
were often already serving as a principal point of contact for federal law enforcement 
and national intelligence agencies. 
Interestingly, though, none of the scenarios used in this project elicited many 
responses that involved state police per se. One or two responses included the state 
police among the range of agencies that should be notified about some information or 
threat revealed in the scenario. One respondent referred several times to the fact that 
the state police in his state dominate the new fusion center but that information sharing 
is no better than in the past. 
Our state police Intelligence Branch has been a failure for decades for agencies 
other than themselves. Even past state police intel commanders will admit that, 
because of the very nature of the state police to horde information and not share 
it with others. I have witnessed local intelligence meetings where the state police 
and at times the FBI have attended and the meeting starts with asking them what 
they have brought to share.  After hearing each of them (mostly state police) say 
they have nothing to report the group goes around the room and everyone says 
the same thing. A few words are given of thanks and the meeting has adjourned 
only to reconvene after the state police have left the building. Then the real 
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information is shared among the locals with a vow of not giving anything to the 
state police.   
We have many statutes that require us to report to the state police but none to 
require them to share information back to anyone. To state the problem simply:  
the state police have an inherent distrust for local LE and all local LE does is 
mirror that distrust right back at them. (PE) 
Several factors may account for the apparent low level of state police involvement in the 
new information sharing environment. One possibility is that the scenarios simply did 
not incorporate elements that would have made state police participation more relevant. 
A second is that state police are a relatively small slice of the law enforcement pie. Also, 
state fusion centers may have superseded state police agencies as the principal state-
level cogs in the system – if so, this probably just reflects how the new system is 
supposed to operate. Additionally, though, it is probably the case that many local 
agencies have their own direct connections to the JTTF, FBI, or other federal agencies, 
so that no state-level involvement is initiated in many situations. From an efficiency 
standpoint this may seem desirable; however, it might limit information sharing and 
intelligence development if pertinent information does not also find its way to broader 
networks such as the state fusion centers or the NCTC. 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Scenario F used for this project specifically involved intelligence developed by an FBI 
analyst relating cigarette smuggling and an international terrorist group. The general 
consensus of respondents was that the FBI would either keep the intelligence to itself 
and conduct an investigation, or they would collaborate with other 
federal/national/military agencies for additional information gathering and 
investigation. Two interviewees thought that the FBI would work with the ATF due to 
the cigarette (tobacco) angle. Three mentioned that the FBI would involve the 
appropriate JTTF, which might be a means of limited information sharing with local 
police, although the intelligence would probably be classified and therefore not widely 
shared. Also, one respondent indicated that the frequency of JTTF meetings might not 
be sufficient to count on them for timely information sharing. 
It is likely this will be a strictly FBI operation. Although it would be good for local 
authorities to know about the investigation, I don’t see it as necessary. It should 
be something that gets briefed in the next JTTF meeting. The difference in 
probably and should here is the frequency of the JTTF meetings. They should be 
no longer than quarterly (monthly is better) but I have heard that some JTTFs 
are meeting only rarely now. (MI) 
This scenario raises a typical “need to know” vs. “need to share” issue. The new 
information-sharing environment is supposed to put greater emphasis on need to 
share.25 One method for doing that, in this scenario, would be for the FBI to forward the 
intelligence report to the NCTC, which would presumably share it with other agencies as 
deemed appropriate. Another avenue would be to enter pertinent information in the 
NCIC VGOTF file. The former method would theoretically be more proactive, since it 
might result in intelligence about cigarette smuggling being widely shared with agencies 
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that could then use it in a variety of ways. The latter method would be more reactive – if 
an officer stopped a vehicle or person somewhere and made a NCIC query, they could be 
notified of the possible terrorism connection. 
One respondent pointed out the importance of collaboration with local police in a 
situation of this type: “the local agency should be involved to assist with intelligence 
information they may have on the location, undercover vehicle stops, etc.” (PI). Another 
potential value of following the “need to share” philosophy in this scenario was outlined 
by a different respondent. 
This type of generic information has been widely circulated for some time now; 
however, instead of working closely with local law enforcement agencies, this 
type of crime is typically worked solely by the FBI/JTTF for follow up. 
Since these types of crimes are not worked by local law enforcement officers, 
they lack the knowledge needed to effectively investigate crimes of this nature. It 
would be beneficial if more training was provided to local law enforcement in this 
area. Local law enforcement needs to recognize when this type of information 
should be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence agencies. More importantly, 
critical information on these types of crimes comes not only through reports or 
information analysis, but also through human sources. Human source 
development training should be enhanced to help local police officers develop 
homeland security sources at the local level. The private sector should also be 
better trained and utilized for recognition and timely reporting of suspicious 
criminal activity related to our homeland security. (PI) 
Information sharing by and with federal law enforcement agencies was potentially 
involved in all the other scenarios used in this project. As previously noted, one concern 
is that information shared directly by a local police agency with the FBI, while 
appropriate for handling a particular investigation, may not get the wider dissemination 
or availability it deserves unless it is also sent to the local agency’s intelligence unit, a 
fusion center, the NCTC, and/or the VGOTF. Also, cases involving explosives or 
cigarette smuggling should probably trigger collaboration between the FBI and ATF, but 
this may not always occur. 
Scenario A involved military discovery of information in Central Asia with a possible 
terrorism link back to the U.S. (images of a chemical plant). Several respondents 
indicated that this information would probably be transmitted to the FBI, but whether it 
would then be shared with local or state police in the threatened jurisdiction might be 
problematic. Among the responses were these: 
May make the FBI Threat Matrix, but will not be released to local law 
enforcement unless authorized at the “Secret” level. I do not expect that local law 
enforcement would be notified, albeit they should. (PE) 
The State Fusion Center will receive the information – if it is not classified as 
“Top Secret;” and if they do they will most likely only share with their state 
police.  At this point in time, the likelihood of the local police department or 
county sheriff being notified is slim to none. (PE) 
The information would flow from military channels to the FBI. The information 
would be classified and passed through to the local JTTFs. The information 
would stay at that level with no notification of the local agency … the [local] 
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agency should be contacted and the substance of the information should be 
passed on.  The source information does not need to be included. (PI) 
If the military chose to share this information, they would be forced to share it at 
the federal level which usually means the FBI. The FBI would assume 
responsibility for follow up and investigation. Local police agencies would have to 
rely on the release of information from a local FBI/JTTF office in order for the 
local police to be involved. Many local police departments do not have direct 
contact with FBI/JTTF offices. (PI) 
As responses to these scenarios illustrate, there remains a good bit of skepticism about 
the free flow of information from federal law enforcement agencies. Improved systems 
for information sharing have been established but they are not always used. The 2007 
National Strategy for Information Sharing and 2008 Information Sharing 
Environment provide additional enhancements that should continue the improvements 
already made. Traditional obstacles and barriers certainly remain even though progress 
has been made. 
Since 9/11, information sharing between the federal government and state and 
locals has improved. Most of the improvement has come through the FBI's Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has tripled in number from 34 before 
September 11 to 100 today. In Los Angeles and other large departments across 
the country, there are active levels of communication and cooperation with the 
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. 
Despite this progress, the level of cooperation seems to vary greatly, 
depending on the personalities of individual bureau and police chiefs. Too often, 
the FBI cuts itself off from local police manpower, expertise, and intelligence. 
More than 6,000 state and local police now have federal security clearances, but 
the historical lack of trust is still an issue. For example, many police chiefs 
complain of calls they get from their JTTF alerting them to a potential threat, but 
when they ask for the detailed information needed to launch an investigation, 
they are told by the bureau: "We can't tell you" or "You don't need to know." 26  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE MILITARY 
This project’s Scenario B posed the situation of a CIA agent in Africa observing a U.S. 
citizen meeting with elements of Al Qaeda. This is a situation involving international 
terrorism, a covert observation made overseas, and information collected by a national 
intelligence agency. The respondents were mixed on whether the information would be 
kept by the CIA, shared with the military, or shared with the FBI. Most were fairly 
certain that local and state police in the citizen’s hometown and state would probably 
not be informed. 
Unless the CIA agent has a friend in the FBI in Kentucky, it is likely this 
information will not go beyond the CIA. What should happen is that both the KY 
FBI and Army Intelligence should be notified of the person and a joint 
investigation conducted to determine if there is any link to activities occurring in 
Kentucky. The FBI would likely run the investigation, but Fort Knox security 
should be notified and kept up on any potential links/threats to the base. (MI) 
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A peripheral check into the subject’s background would be performed by the CIA 
and without further results would cause the subject to be entered into a database 
accessed only by the CIA or Military. This information might be shared with Fort 
Knox but not with local agencies surrounding the base … The subject should be 
thoroughly investigated by the FBI including contacting local agencies to see if 
the subject might be wanted on criminal charges unrelated to terrorism. Often an 
arrest and follow up interview can provide an opportunity to obtain further 
information regarding the terrorism angle. The subject should also be entered 
into VGTOF through NCIC to alert local police once they have contacted the 
subject that he may be involved in terrorism activities. (PI) 
Currently, the information would not necessarily be disseminated to local law 
enforcement agencies in a timely manner. Information sharing on U.S. Citizens 
abroad is usually limited to local law enforcement sending local information up 
the intelligence chain about subject activities while they were in the U.S. Local 
police would not receive information directly from the CIA, but would rely on 
information passed from the CIA to the FBI and then hopefully to the local police. 
Information collected abroad would need to be sanitized to enable timely 
dissemination to local law enforcement. (PI) 
A consequence in this scenario of restricted information sharing up from the local police 
level was also anticipated by one police executive. 
The information will stay with the CIA and maybe will be shared with the FBI. I 
do not believe the information will be pushed down to any lower levels at this 
time. However, due to the nature of information not going up from the local level 
to the Fusion Center, there may be valuable information about this citizen in local 
police data bases and because of the lack of trust, lack of cooperation and lack of 
quality information sharing back and forth between local LE and state police, the 
information will therefore never be shared with the CIA. (PE) 
Scenario A is the only one that began with the military, in this case soldiers discovering 
a computer in a cave in Central Asia containing images of a U.S. chemical plant. Several 
respondents suspected that the information would be retained by the military, while 
others believed it would be shared with the FBI.  
The information should be forwarded by the DOD intelligence component 
through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which would forward it 
to the KY fusion center who then share it with all appropriate LE agencies in KY 
… [but] there is a good chance the NCTC would not receive the information. (AE) 
Given there is no information in the scenario about pending attack (only images), 
it is likely nothing would be done and no information shared until after [final 
analysis of the computer]. Usually, the Army/DOD is pretty good about getting 
information like this to the FBI. It would likely flow to the SAC with 
responsibility for Ashland. From there, it all depends on the relationship between 
the Kentucky FBI and local entities. (MI) 
This would be classified by the military at the Secret, most likely Top Secret level, 
and sent to analysis by Central Command. I do not expect to hear anything 
further on this in time to be actionable. May make the FBI Threat Matrix, but will 
not be released to local law enforcement unless authorized at the Secret level. I do 
not expect that local law enforcement would be notified, albeit they should. (PE) 
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None of the project interviewees expected any prompt information sharing with the 
local police in the chemical plant’s jurisdiction. Notification to the chemical plant’s 
corporate security seemed about as likely as to local police. One specific problem 
interfering with sharing of the information was its likely classification as secret or top 
secret. 
The issues are two-fold: first, although necessary for national security, the laws 
pertaining to sharing intelligence information between law enforcement and the 
military (posse comitatus) have not been updated and do not adequately address 
the loss of information in the critical need to exchange information. Secondly, 
instead of sanitizing information so it can be easily disseminated to law 
enforcement officers, similar information would usually be over-classified and 
therefore would never be disseminated to those who need the information the 
most. (PI) 
Despite the fact that this information would most likely be held closely and not promptly 
shared with local authorities (if shared at all), several respondents felt wider sharing 
would be beneficial. 
The differences between what is likely and what should be are these: (1) the 
information about the images should be initially released as soon as they are 
discovered (initial analysis). Doesn’t have to be extensive, but the authorities in 
Ashland should know about it early; (2) there should be some formal information 
sharing arrangements between DOD and FBI about cases like this (if they don’t 
already exist); (3) there should be an investigation opened by the FBI and locals 
to determine if there is something that should be investigated further indicating a 
potential attack and why the images were gathered.  (MI) 
This information should be shared with the FBI to evaluate as national security 
intelligence. Follow up should be completed by the FBI with any law enforcement 
agencies which may respond to a call for service in the event something happens 
to the plant. Since the information does not center around a person (yet), the 
right to privacy is not an issue and the intelligence generated from it may be 
shared. (PI) 
This type of information should be shared and analyzed at a variety of levels in 
order to obtain a better view of its relevance to local criminal activities. The 
information should be shared through timely channels and analyzed not only by 
the military, but at the national, state, regional, county, tribal and local levels. By 
viewing the information from a variety of perspectives, there would be a greater 
chance of filling the intelligence gap and turning information into actionable 
intelligence. Sharing information would also foster greater cooperation between 
agencies rather than local law enforcement learning about local threats through 
the National media. Timely sharing of information would also allow local law 
enforcement officers to implement a more effective collection plan of new 
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It seems apparent that procedures and protocols for counterterrorism information 
sharing have not achieved full implementation. Subject matter experts responding to six 
scenarios often differed in what they thought should happen, and often judged that what 
would happen would be less than full-scale information sharing. Most expected that 
investigations would be narrower and less collaborative than desirable. In many cases 
the experts thought information sharing would not be as systematic as it should, 
between and among intelligence agencies and especially with local police. Some 
opportunities to engage local police in intelligence gathering were not expected to be 
utilized because doing so might require intelligence agencies to take police into their 
confidence. Over-classification of intelligence was expected to interfere with information 
sharing. Often, the likelihood of information sharing was seen as dependent on the 
existence of personal contacts and relationships. 
Part of the explanation for differences in what should happen follows from the 
complexity of the inter-organizational environment surrounding counter-terrorism. The 
police system has 18,000 separate agencies, including 18,000 CEOs and, potentially, 
18,000 terrorism liaison officers. The number of national intelligence and military 
intelligence agencies is much smaller but each of these agencies is large and complex in 
its own right. This extremely large inter-organizational set exists within a maze of 
federal and state law, bureaucratic rules, traditions, customs, and politics. 
 Another part of the explanation is that the situation is new and evolving. Local police 
have little experience at counterterrorism or domestic/homeland security intelligence. 
Before 9/11 they had little reason to interact with national intelligence or military 
intelligence agencies. The notion of transnational crime was exotic enough for most 
police agencies – international terrorism seemed even less likely to affect Main Street, 
city hall, or hometown security. Now, suddenly, there are state fusion centers and a 
complicated information sharing environment of new alphabet-soup federal agencies 
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), NCTC, and the 
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG). 
Besides complexity and newness, though, there seems to be a great deal of residual 
resentment and tension clogging counterterrorism information-sharing channels, 
affecting what would happen in various scenarios. The “need to know” mentality still 
seems to outweigh the “need to share” mentality. Petty inter-agency jealousies seem to 
remain, as evidenced most recently between the FBI and the NYPD (whose 
counterterrorism chief is a former CIA official) in the Najibullah Zazi case.27 Local 
agencies still think of information sharing as a one-way experience, lacking confidence 
that state police, fusion centers, or federal agencies will share information with local 
agencies and officials when they should. 
At the state level, it seems absolutely essential in the new information sharing 
environment that fusion centers learn to function as state-wide entities rather than state 
police entities. In the former mode, they stand a chance of being perceived as serving all 
agencies in the state, and if they in fact disseminate useful information and products to 
all agencies, they should become critical assets for both intra-state and national 
information sharing.28 On the other hand, if they come to be seen as glorified state 
police units serving state police interests first and foremost, then they will provide little 
added value and will not substantially improve information sharing. Local agencies will 
tend not to participate, they will create their own fusion centers when possible, and they 
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will continue to create their own individual relationships with federal agencies in an ad 
hoc manner. This seems to be a very crucial distinction that is still being worked out 
around the country, with no guarantee of success. 
Beyond the state level, it is interesting that only two of the respondents consistently 
referred to the NCTC and information sharing environment throughout the scenarios, 
and none referred to the ITACG. The NCTC was established in 2004 and includes 
federal law enforcement agencies, national intelligence agencies, and the military among 
its partner organizations. As described on the NCTC website:  
NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States Government for 
integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism possessed or 
acquired by the United States Government (except purely domestic terrorism); 
serves as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information; [and] 
provides all-source intelligence support to government-wide counterterrorism 
activities.29  
The NCTC is assisted by the ITACG, which specifically represents the interests of state 
and local law enforcement and related officials. Its purpose is to enable and facilitate the 
production of “federally-coordinated” terrorism-related information and products that 
are shared “through existing channels” with state and local agencies. The ITACG is 
billed as a temporary step in coordinating federal law enforcement and national 
intelligence communication with state and local agencies, “until such time as the ISE 
matures organizationally and culturally to satisfy those needs as a normal part of doing 
business.” 
Together, these new entities, along with the 2007 National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and the Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy,30 are 
supposed to assure that terrorism-related information and intelligence are shared more 
effectively among all the counterterrorism players, including state and local police, 
federal law enforcement, federal and state homeland security operations, the national 
intelligence community, and the military. The fact that much of this new architecture 
and strategy was not cited by most project respondents may reflect its newness, or it 
may indicate that old habits have yet to be replaced by new ones.31 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This small exploratory study is not a firm foundation from which to offer any strong 
recommendations for improving intelligence and information sharing. Moreover, the 
complexity of the inter-organizational environment of law enforcement-related and 
homeland security-related information sharing is daunting, comprised as it is of 
thousands of local, state, and federal agencies, plus the military. One would be hard 
pressed to design a more complicated or challenging system. Fundamentally, of course, 
it is a system intended to limit the power of the government rather than maximize its 
effectiveness. 
A 2001 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on information sharing for 
critical infrastructure protection emphasized the importance of building trust between 
officials and agencies.32 Recommended techniques for building trust included regular 
interaction, consistent representation, appropriate vetting of participants, creation of an 
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atmosphere of mutual respect, and enforcement of information sharing norms. 
Additional recommendations included timely and secure communication, top 
management support, leadership continuity, penalties for failing to share information, 
and rewards for sharing. 
Beyond these basic principles, a few specific intelligence-sharing suggestions can be 
offered: 
• State fusion centers have to figure out how to serve their entire state, not just the 
state police. DHS might insist that these centers have governing boards with 
majority local representatives. That would help get local law enforcement buy-in and 
participation. State police could still house or run the centers, but they would have to 
be responsive to local interests in order to maintain the support of their governing 
board. 
• Model agreements between local law enforcement agencies and state fusion centers 
should be developed and implemented. These agreements could stipulate that the 
local agency will complete and submit SAR in a systematic and timely manner, but 
also mandate the fusion center to report back on SAR utilization and generally 
obligate the fusion center to operate on a “need to share” basis. 
• All agencies should adopt the “tear line” practice as a means of implementing “need 
to share.” This practice puts non-classified information found in intelligence reports 
below a “tear line” so that it can be disseminated more quickly and more broadly. 
Information that would compromise intelligence sources and methods remains 
“above the tear line” and still does not get disseminated except to qualified recipients 
who “need to know.”  
• JTTF meetings need to be held with reasonable frequency to keep local chiefs and 
commanders in the intelligence loop and to build and maintain the trust needed to 
encourage information sharing. If these meetings are held frequently, and if “need to 
share” is the operating philosophy, then local law enforcement suspicion and 
resentment can easily be minimized. 
As simplistic as some of these recommendations sound, they would probably be 
sufficient to resolve much of the gridlock associated with local law enforcement’s 
participation in counterterrorism intelligence and information sharing. That is because, 
with the exception of the NYPD and a very few other big city agencies, local police 
agencies do not see themselves in competition with each other or with state and federal 
agencies in the intelligence game. Most of them would like to play their role and do their 
part, as long as state and federal agencies cooperate and treat them fairly. 
At the federal level, the situation is different. Federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies often do seem to regard each other as the competition. They also 
seem to regard local law enforcement agencies as inferior or perhaps untrustworthy (or, 
in the case of the NYPD, as competition). Beyond systematic and persistent efforts at 
trust building, forceful action by the president, attorney general, DHS secretary, and 
Congress would seem necessary to overcome longstanding traditions and the 
political/bureaucratic pathologies that currently inhibit significant improvement in 
information sharing among the heavyweight agencies in the national intelligence 
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community, and between those agencies and their more humble counterparts in state 
and local law enforcement. 
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